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DISCUSSING PRIVACY IN SEC SUBPOENA PRACTICE AFTER
CARPENTER V. UNITED STATES
WILLIAM A. BALLENTINE *
INTRODUCTION
Imagine the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) has initiated a formal investigation into a hedge fund after suspecting several key
officers of insider trading and conducting a thorough examination. One of
the fund executives receives a subpoena ordering all the documents in her
office “related to the investigation” be turned over to the SEC, including
her emails, chat room conversations, travel records, expense reports, and
any other business-related communications. Although firm policy requires
written work-related communications to be done only through company
email or Bloomberg chat, the executive is concerned that her personal
smart phone may be implicated in the subpoena as well. Many of her fellow colleagues are also her friends, so naturally she uses her smart phone
for both personal and work-related reasons.
This Note discusses what effects, if any, the decision handed down in
Carpenter v. United States may have on national subpoena practice, focusing solely on the Securities and Exchange Commission as the agency generally enjoys broad authority to issue subpoenas. Part I explains the
background leading up to Carpenter and its highly anticipated holdings
about statutorily mandated production being unable to endure Fourth
Amendment scrutiny. An analysis of three different ways to acquire information in a government investigation—through a warrant, grand jury subpoena, or the Stored Communications Act in certain circumstances—takes
place in Part II. Part III then discusses the general standard for administrative subpoenas as a fourth method of obtaining information. As a method
requiring less of a showing than the Stored Communications Act, this Note
will argue that issuing an administrative subpoena for personal documents
would not likely withstand a Fourth Amendment challenge as seen in Carpenter. Part IV discusses troubling scenarios where the SEC could demand
* Chicago-Kent College of Law, Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2020. I would like to thank Professor
Doug Godfrey for his inspiration and guidance throughout writing this Note.
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private documents, along with what a Fourth Amendment challenge to an
SEC subpoena may sound like after Carpenter. Finally, Part V makes concluding comments about subpoena practice and privacy in a modern world.
I. CARPENTER V. UNITED STATES
Carpenter is a highly anticipated Supreme Court case concerning the
privacy of an individual’s historical cell phone location records stored with
a wireless carrier. The decision was handed down in June 2018. In delivering the opinion of the Court, Chief Justice Roberts emphasized how pervasive cell phone usage has become in modern American society and, thus,
expressed concern over colliding technological advancements and civil
liberties. Certainly, Americans have become accustomed to cell phones
being an integral part of everyday life. Approximately 94% of American
adults in modern society use cell phones for various functions and pleasures, especially considering the seemingly endless capabilities of the popular smartphone. 1 Cell phones enable people to be readily available and
follow people everywhere they go—even to the most intimate spaces.
While there is no doubt cell phones provide an ease to certain aspects of
life, the technology also inherently requires anyone with a cell phone to
sacrifice some of their privacy.
To perform properly, cell phones must connect to radio antennas
called “cell-sites” which are found in a variety of places, such as towers or
light posts.2 Modern devices are constantly scanning the surrounding area
for a signal—sometimes multiple times a minute—even when the cell
phone’s owner is not actively using the phone’s features.3 In effect, cell
phones are continuously relaying their approximate location to cell towers
and, thus, the user’s cell service provider. The accuracy of the cell phone’s
location directly depends on the concentration of the cell-sites in a given
area, so populated urban areas are seeing increasingly compact coverage as
more cell-sites are installed there. 4
This geographic data is properly referred to as an individual’s cell-site
location information (CSLI), which are time-stamped records created every
time a cell phone connects to a cell-site. 5 Cell phone service providers reg1. KYLE TAYLOR & LAURA SILVER, PEW RESEARCH CTR., SMARTPHONE OWNERSHIP IS
GROWING RAPIDLY AROUND THE WORLD, BUT NOT ALWAYS EQUALLY (2019),
http://www.pewglobal.org/2019/02/05/smartphone-ownership-is-growing-rapidly-around-the-worldbut-not-always-equally/ [https://perma.cc/V43S-V8H5].
2. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 2211–12.
5. Id. at 2211.
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ularly collect this data for performance and billing purposes. 6 Law enforcement may access this data as it happens in real time by asking the
court for a prospective order, or it may access the data already retained by
the service provider to get a better sense of a suspect’s past whereabouts.7
In both instances, law enforcement must apply for a court order to access
the data. 8
Law enforcement can request both historical and prospective CSLI
through administrative processes in order to put together a sequence of past
events or to ascertain the location of an individual during a past crime. 9 In
Carpenter, the Government sought to do just that by relying on a statutory
regime, namely the Stored Communications Act (SCA), to gain access to a
criminal suspect’s historical location information through the suspect’s cell
service provider. 10
A. Background
The United States Government suspected that Timothy Carpenter, the
petitioner in this case, played a role in a series of robberies that took place
around the Detroit area in 2011.11 Initially, police officers arrested four
men other than Carpenter for the robberies, and one confessed to robbing
nine stores in Michigan and Ohio. 12 The same suspect revealed there were
fifteen accomplices in the heists and gave up some of their cell phone numbers to the FBI. 13 Timothy Carpenter’s phone number was among the
phone numbers on the list that the FBI received.
Relying on the SCA, the prosecutors applied for court orders and obtained Carpenter’s historical cell site information from the four-month time
frame when the robberies occurred.14 Federal magistrate judges issued two
orders to Carpenter’s cellular service providers, MetroPCS and Sprint: the
first order sought 152 days of cell-site records from MetroPCS, and the
6. Kevin McLaughlin, The Fourth Amendment and Cell Phone Location Tracking: Where Are
We?, 29 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 421, 431 (2007).
7. Id.
8. Patrick T. Chamberlain, Court Ordered Disclosure of Historical Cell Site Location Information: The Argument for a Probable Cause Standard, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1745, 1747–48
(2009).
9. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, CELL PHONE LOCATION
TRACKING,
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/2016-06-07_Cell-TrackingPrimer_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/LQ8K-2KF3] [hereinafter NACDL].
10. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221.
11. Id. at 2212.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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second order sought seven days of cell-site records from Sprint. 15 The orders produced 127 days of records and two days of records from MetroPCS
and Sprint, respectively. 16
Based on the cell-site data provided by wireless carriers, Carpenter
was charged with multiple counts of both robbery and “carrying a firearm
during a federal crime of violence.” 17 Carpenter’s chief argument relied on
the Fourth Amendment. Carpenter argued his Fourth Amendment rights
were violated when the Government seized CSLI from his wireless carriers
absent the traditional probable cause requirement, and he moved to suppress the records before trial.18 The district court denied the motion, and at
trial an FBI agent’s expert testimony about CSLI placed Carpenter’s phone
near four of the robberies at the time the robberies occurred. 19 Consequently, Carpenter was convicted on all counts except for one of the firearm
counts, and he was sentenced to over 100 years in prison. 20
At the appellate level, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding Carpenter had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the
CSLI because he voluntarily shared the data with each of his cellular service providers.21 Thus, Carpenter could not claim that his Fourth Amendment rights protected the disclosure of those resulting business records.22
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
B. Reasoning
In Carpenter, the Supreme Court delivered two significant holdings:
(1) accessing at least seven days of CSLI constitutes a search under the
purview of the Fourth Amendment given the legitimate expectation of privacy in physical movements captured by CSLI; and (2) to access those
CSLI records, a warrant supported by probable cause is required.
The first of the two primary holdings is important for understanding
the type of information that is under the Fourth Amendment’s purview and
to what extent the Court is willing to extend Fourth Amendment doctrine in
an increasingly technological world. Arguably, the second holding concerning warrants and subpoenas is of greater significance as it potentially
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Id.
Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006).
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212.
Id. at 2212–13.
Id. at 2213.
Id.
Id.
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calls a subpoena’s utility into question. Section III will address the Fourth
Amendment’s relation to warrants and subpoenas—and the difference between the two.
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the opinion, and there was a clear majority with the decision being 5-4. The four liberal-leaning Justices—Justice
Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor—joined the Chief Justice. In
turn, Justice Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch each wrote separate
dissenting opinions. In particular, Justice Alito’s dissent emphasized the
negative implications for subpoena practice.
The Government’s access of Carpenter’s cell-site records was a search
under the Fourth Amendment.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts was tasked with explaining how the Fourth Amendment works in light of a “new phenomenon”; that is, the new capability to obtain all of an individual’s past
movements by accessing his or her cell phone records. 23 The first step, as is
true for most Fourth Amendment questions, was to decide whether obtaining Carpenter’s cell-site data from his wireless carriers would be considered a search under Fourth Amendment doctrine.
In pertinent part, the Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures.” 24 Its main purpose is “to safeguard
the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.” 25 Repudiating the old Fourth Amendment doctrine
traditionally linked with common-law trespass, the Court reestablished it is
“people, not places,” that the Fourth Amendment protects. 26 For an official
action to be considered a Fourth Amendment search, it must have violated
an individual’s subjective expectation of privacy “that society is prepared
to recognize as reasonable.” 27 In turn, access to that private information
requires a warrant supported by probable cause. 28
The Court is intent on protecting individual privacy against arbitrary
and pervasive police power by acknowledging that Fourth Amendment
boundaries will be stretched as technology becomes more advanced. 29 For
example, the Court has applied the Fourth Amendment flexibly in some
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 2216.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335 (1985).
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213.
Id. at 2214; McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 429–30.
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cases to make sure that an individual’s privacy was not left to “the mercy
of advancing technology.” 30
Carpenter marks the first instance where the Court considered the
Government’s warrantless access to an individual’s cell-site location data
through his wireless carrier. The reasoning employed in existing precedents
did not easily agree with the facts—specifically, the cell-site data—in this
case. 31 Largely, the Court relied on United States v. Jones, where the Government tracked an individual’s movements for 28 days after placing a GPS
tracking device on his vehicle. 32 While Jones was decided based on trespass principles, the concurring opinions indicated that long-term GPS
tracking in investigations often infringe on expectations of privacy and may
require a warrant. 33
Similar to the GPS tracking in Jones, CSLI is “detailed, encyclopedic,
and effortlessly compiled.”34 According to the Government, however, the
third-party doctrine should have controlled the outcome of Carpenter. 35
Based on United States v. Miller36 and Smith v. Maryland, 37 the Government asserted it was free to obtain Carpenter’s cell-site records without
infringing his Fourth Amendment rights because he voluntarily turned that
data over to a third party. 38 Still, because the data conveyed to third parties
in this case gave a “detailed and comprehensive record of [Carpenter’s]
movements,” the fact that the data rested with a third party was not enough
to overcome Carpenter’s Fourth Amendment concerns. 39
In the majority’s view, the privacy concerns surrounding CSLI are
more troubling than those encountered when the Government monitors a
vehicle with a tracking device. 40 An individual’s reasonable expectation of
privacy extends to “the whole of [his] physical movements” and, consider30. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34–35 (2001) (holding that federal agents conducted
a Fourth Amendment search when they used a thermal imaging device scan an individual’s home).
31. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214.
32. 565 U.S. 400, 404–05 (2012).
33. Id. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment); Id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
34. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216.
35. Id. at 2219.
36. 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (holding that a bank patron had no expectation of privacy in the
financial records held by his bank).
37. 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979) (holding that an individual had no expectation of privacy in records
of dialed telephone numbers kept with a telephone company).
38. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219.
39. Id. at 2216–17, 2220. For a discussion about the status of the third-party doctrine, see Orin S.
Kerr, First Thoughts on Carpenter v. United States, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jun. 22, 2018, 12:20 PM),
https://reason.com/volokh/2018/06/22/first-thoughts-on-carpenter-v-united-sta
[https://perma.cc/M5HG-K59T].
40. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218.
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ing individuals are rarely without their cell phones, government access to
cell phone location records allows almost perfect surveillance of a cell
phone user’s movements. 41 Accordingly, the Government accessing Carpenter’s cell-site records—even while they were stored with a third party—
constituted a Fourth Amendment search.42
The Government must have obtained a warrant supported by probable
cause before accessing Carpenter’s cell-site records.
After finding the Government’s access to Carpenter’s cell-site records
constituted a Fourth Amendment search, the Court questioned what standard the government must satisfy in order to lawfully acquire those records. 43 When law enforcement officials conduct a search to discover
evidence of a crime without a warrant, the search is typically deemed unreasonable unless it qualifies as an exception to the warrant requirement. 44
Here, the Government compelled Carpenter’s wireless carriers to disclose his cell-site records by obtaining a court order under Section 2703(d)
of the Stored Communications Act. 45 Court orders are only issued under
Section 2703(d) if the Government or governmental entity shows “reasonable grounds” to believe that the records sought are “relevant and material to
an ongoing criminal investigation.” 46 Compared to the standard required
for a warrant—probable cause—the Section 2703(d) standard is clearly less
demanding. 47 Accordingly, the Government’s use of court-approved compulsory process under the SCA was an invalid method for accessing an
individual’s CSLI—a warrant was still required. 48
Chief Justice Roberts then turned to the contrary arguments in Justice
Alito’s dissenting opinion. For Justice Alito, the compulsory production of
documents is merely a “constructive search” that is far less intrusive on an
individual’s privacy than an “actual search,” and the warrant requirement
should not apply in such instances. 49 In theory, a subpoenaed individual
conducts the search for the relevant documents himself and avoids any
inadvertent invasions of privacy that might accompany an actual search
conducted by a governmental official. 50 Thus, a court order to produce
41. Id. at 2219. The majority notes that the technology considered in this case is “rapidly approaching GPS-level precision.” Id.
42. Id. at 2220.
43. Id. at 2221.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2018); Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221.
47. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 2255 (Alito, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 2252 (Alito, J., dissenting).

728

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol 95:3

documents should not be treated like an actual search that requires probable
cause. 51
But the majority again stressed that CSLI is wrought with Fourth
Amendment privacy concerns that far outweigh those that accompany
“corporate tax or payroll ledgers” mentioned in the examples Justice Alito
cites. 52 If Fourth Amendment protection did not apply to the subpoena process as Justice Alito suggests, the majority asserts the warrant requirement
would no longer be able to protect any type of record, and the government
could subpoena any document based only on “official curiosity.”53 The
majority was not willing to adopt that categorical limitation on the Fourth
Amendment.
Regardless of the majority’s reassurances, Justice Alito fears that imposing the requirements governing actual searches and seizures on a court
order to produce documents is “revolutionary” and will hinder investigations of significant offenses. 54
II. THE SCA AND TWO COMPETING STANDARDS TO PRODUCE
DOCUMENTS
In criminal procedure, there are traditionally two kinds of legal process available when the Government wants to gain access to some sort of
incriminating evidence—namely, the search warrant and subpoena process. 55 The two paths are distinguishable in that their execution is regulated
by two different legal regimes.56 For a search warrant, the Fourth Amendment limits and imposes a higher standard on investigators. 57 Issuing a
grand jury subpoena, on the other hand, may be done without abiding by
the stringent requirements for a search warrant. The Fourth Amendment
still applies in the subpoena context, but its presence is not very significant
for reasons discussed below.
If search warrants and grand jury subpoenas are at opposite ends of
the spectrum in terms of the legal standard involved to obtain evidence,
then the process laid out in Section 2703(d) of the Stored Communications
Act is somewhere in between. The “2703(d)” order could be described as
51. Id. at 2221.
52. Id. at 2222.
53. Id. (quoting United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950)).
54. Id. at 2247 (Alito, J., dissenting).
55. Orin S. Kerr, Does Carpenter Revolutionize the Law of Subpoenas?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(Jun. 26, 2018, 5:36 PM), http://reason.com/volokh/2018/06/26/does-carpenter-revolutionize-the-law-of
[https://perma.cc/QC4D-DBCW].
56. Id.
57. Id.
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“a mix between a subpoena and a search warrant.”58 Nonetheless, the Court
in Carpenter held the Congress-prescribed standard for compelling production of records featured in the SCA could not pass muster Fourth Amendment scrutiny—at least in the CSLI context—and a warrant is still required
to access those records. 59
The Carpenter holding raises several concerns about subpoena practice: (1) Whether and how the holding affects grand jury or administrative
subpoenas, where there is seemingly a lower standard to meet; and (2)
Whether warrants now subsume the role of subpoenas from grand juries
and administrative agencies, alike. To begin answering some of these questions, understanding the legal processes available for obtaining documents
and their relative standards is imperative.
A. The Warrant Requirement
In criminal investigations, the most familiar legal mechanism used to
obtain evidence is the search warrant. 60 A valid search warrant allows investigators to physically intrude into a private area in order to obtain information; however, the Fourth Amendment offers individual protections—
applied to both criminal and civil investigations—that generally place limits on investigators. 61 Under the Fourth Amendment, people are afforded
the right “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,” and to
be protected “against unreasonable searches and seizures.” 62 The Amendment also requires probable cause to accompany each warrant a magistrate
or judge issues. 63
At the forefront, the Fourth Amendment was adopted “to safeguard
the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by government officials.” 64 Without the clear authority of law, government officials have no right to interfere with an individual’s personal security, which
is “sacred.” 65 And “the protection against warrantless searches and seizures” works to ensure that a neutral magistrate’s judgment acts as a buffer

58. Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to
Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1219 (2004).
59. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018).
60. Kerr, supra note 55.
61. Id.
62. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
63. Id.
64. T.L.O., supra note 25, at 335.
65. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
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between individuals and the unbridled power of a government “official
caught up in the heat of an investigation.” 66
Accordingly, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable.67 Even
though the Fourth Amendment does not necessarily require a warrant or
probable cause to support a search, the Supreme Court has held a warrant is
presumably required for searches and seizures unless “a specific exception
to the warrant requirement” applies.68
While most warrantless searches are done upon consent, other exceptions to the warrant requirement exist only in rare circumstances. The constitutionality of a warrantless Fourth Amendment search turns on a
question of reasonableness, determined by “balancing its intrusion on the
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” 69 Where special law enforcement needs, low
expectations of privacy, and minimal intrusions exist, a warrantless search
is more likely to be considered reasonable, and, thus, constitutional. 70
1. Probable Cause
Aside from special circumstances, investigators generally need a warrant supported by probable cause to conduct an official search protected by
the Fourth Amendment. After all, the warrant requirement is partially based
on the idea that any search or seizure is inherently wrong and should not be
executed without first determining whether the action is truly necessary. 71
And if a search must take place, the scope of the search should be limited. 72
A search warrant requires a different factual showing than an arrest
warrant, given that the two protect different interests listed in the Fourth
Amendment.73 While an arrest warrant addresses an individual’s right
against unreasonable seizures, search warrants protect an individual’s “rea66. 79 C.J.S. Searches § 16 (2018).
67. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles, Calif. v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2452 (2015) (concluding a
municipal code requiring hotel operators to provide police with information about guests was unconstitutional); Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
See 79 C.J.S. Searches § 15 (2018).
68. See Investigations and Police Practices, 47 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 3, 4 n.4 (2018)
[hereinafter Investigations]; Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382 (2014) (A warrantless search is
unreasonable unless “it falls within a specific exception to the warrant requirement”).
69. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652–53 (1995) (quoting Skinner v. Railway
Labor Executives’ Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989)) (concluding that random urinalysis tests of student
athletes were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment considering the state’s legitimate interests and
the intrusiveness of the tests).
70. 79 C.J.S. Searches § 15 (2018).
71. See Searches, supra note 66.
72. Id.
73. Investigations, supra note 68, at 25.

2020]

CARPENTER V. UNITED STATES

731

sonable expectation of privacy”74 and possessions against government intrusion. These protections hold especially true for individuals in their own
home; although, the Supreme Court has articulated that “the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places.” 75
A magistrate may only issue a search warrant after investigators show
“probable cause to believe that the legitimate object of a search is located
in a particular place.” 76 “[P]robable cause is a flexible, common-sense
standard” that depends on the totality of the circumstances in each case.77
Still, the factual showing required for probable cause is significant—a reasonable and unbiased mind must be persuaded to believe a crime has actually occurred as opposed to causing mere suspicion or speculation of a
crime. 78
Probable cause does not require certainty on the belief that the sought
evidence will establish a prima facie element of a crime.79 Instead, what is
relevant is the probability that a crime has occurred and the probability that
criminal evidence exists and will be found. 80 In assessing these probabilities, magistrates consult all the facts and circumstances within the warrant
application using a “practical, common-sense” approach. 81
2. The Particularity Requirement
To avoid “wide-ranging exploratory searches,” a search warrant must
describe with particularity the places that will be searched and the people
or objects that will be seized under the Fourth Amendment. 82 The requirement ensures searches are narrowly tailored to the justification making
them necessary at the outset and prevents, among other things, warrants
from being issued without an adequate factual basis or probable cause. 83
Like probable cause, the totality of circumstances in each case determines whether a search warrant describes a place with sufficient particularity—the description ought to be as precise as possible given the
circumstances. 84 The particularity question also considers whether the war74. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 351.
76. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 213 (1981).
77. 79 C.J.S. Searches § 67 (2018).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983); Investigations, supra note 68, at 28.
82. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987); U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
83. 79 C.J.S. Searches § 235 (2018).
84. 79 C.J.S. Searches § 236 (2018).
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rant provides adequate protection for an individual’s privacy and personal
rights, and whether the warrant puts the party searched on proper notice. 85
The description within the warrant should be precise enough so as to
leave the executing officer without the opportunity to exercise any of his or
her own discretion during the search. 86 But when a warrant is overbroad or
otherwise mistaken, an executing officer may use his or her personal
knowledge to narrow down the intended search area. 87
3. The Grand Jury Subpoena
Indeed, warrants are often used during criminal investigations. But the
warrant is not the only legal process available to obtain information—the
subpoena is the primary mechanism the Government uses routinely to collect records and other documents.88 Grand juries issue thousands of these
each year. 89
As distinguished from a search warrant, which allows government officials to physically intrude on private property in search of incriminating
evidence, a subpoena duces tecum directs a recipient to gather evidence his
or herself and bring the evidence to a grand jury at a later date.90 A thirdparty witness may also be summoned to testify in front of a grand jury with
a subpoena ad testificandum.91
By using a subpoena, the Government may obtain access to various
kinds of “papers” with a far lesser showing than probable cause. In that
main respect, the law regarding grand jury subpoenas is very different from
the law governing warrants—which also explains why subpoenas are preferable to search warrants when it comes to requesting routine documents.
A subpoena, unlike a search warrant issued ex parte, may be challenged by the recipient before compliance. 92 Under the Fourth Amendment,
the only refuge available to a recipient is arguing that the subpoena is overbroad, irrelevant, or too burdensome to comply with. 93 Courts show extreme deference to the grand jury and, consequently, these objections rarely

85. Id.
86. Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925).
87. Investigations, supra note 68, at 34.
88. Christopher Slobogin, Subpoenas and Privacy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 805, 805 (2005).
89. Id.
90. Kerr, supra note 55.
91. 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 21 (2018).
92. Slobogin, supra note 88, at 806, 810.
93. Id. at 806; United States v. Golden Valley Elec. Ass’n, 689 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2012); In re
Grand Jury Subpoena, 920 F.2d 235, 243–244 (4th Cir. 1990).
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prevail. 94 For example, there would have to be “no reasonable possibility”
that the information the Government is seeking relates to the subject matter
of the grand jury’s investigation in order for a subpoena to be struck down
as irrelevant. 95
Still, a recipient may challenge a subpoena using another means,
namely, his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. In a
unique circumstance when responding to a subpoena duces tecum, an individual may be able to assert Fifth Amendment privilege if the act of producing the documents requested conveys additional information that may
be incriminating. 96 Usually, the Fifth Amendment privilege is unavailable. 97
Consequently, grand jury subpoenas duces tecum are easily enforced.98 They are controlled and issued in the name of the grand jury; but,
in reality, the prosecutors who manage the grand jury are behind each subpoena—prosecutors ask for, draft, serve, and defend each subpoena.99
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has traditionally held grand jury subpoenas to a low standard, indicating that a subpoena seeking to satisfy “nothing
more than official curiosity” is constitutional.100 The Government may use
a subpoena to acquire documents so long as “the documents sought are
relevant to the [investigation]” and the document request is “adequate, but
not excessive,” for those same purposes. 101
Before Carpenter, subpoenas aimed at third-party recordholders
seemed to be unrestricted. The phenomenon was especially concerning
given that modern society often requires personal information be kept with
some third party—and third parties are unable to plausibly assert the Fifth
Amendment privilege over someone else’s information.102 In the same
context, the third-party doctrine curtailed any Fourth Amendment claims
94. Slobogin, supra note 88, at 806.
95. United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 301 (1991) (rejecting a company’s challenge
to grand jury subpoenas for corporate records because it did not establish there was no reasonable
possibility the information produced would be relevant to the grand jury’s investigation).
96. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976) (noting that a party conceding that it possesses the requested papers is a foregone conclusion and does not add any useful incriminating information to the investigation).
97. Slobogin, supra note 88, at 806.
98. Id.
99. Kerr, supra note 55.
100. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) (concluding agencies have a right
to request information from corporations even if for no other reason than “official curiosity”).
101. Okla. Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946) (upholding the production of a
newspaper publishing corporation’s books and records as request was made pursuant to statute and was
reasonably relevant).
102. Slobogin, supra note 88, at 808.
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over information voluntarily shared with a third party. 103 Now, Carpenter
at least signifies that conveying information to a third party is but a factor
in determining whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in such information—the conveyance is not dispositive.
B. The Stored Communications Act
Enacted as Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986, the SCA regulates both the voluntary and compelled disclosure of
stored internet communications records retained by internet service providers. 104 Largely, Congress enacted the SCA to bridge the gap between legitimate Fourth Amendment concerns and the internet’s general structure.105
The Fourth Amendment, while generally ensuring strong protections for
individuals in their homes, might not offer those same protections to individuals operating online. 106 For example, the Government must obtain a
search warrant supported by probable cause to search someone’s home for
a letter in a desk drawer but only needs a subpoena to access that same
letter remotely stored in a Google web account under the third-party doctrine.107 The letter clearly has much less protection in the latter scenario.
Consequently, the SCA works to provide network account holders with
various statutory rights making access to their stored account information
more secure. 108
Under the SCA, the government typically seeks two types of information: (1) contents of wire or electronic communications in electronic
storage and remote computing services109; and (2) “records concerning
electronic communication service[s] or remote computing service[s],”
which notably do not contain the contents of communications.110 Cell-site
location information falls under the latter category; the information does
not qualify as the “contents of communications.” 111 Thus, Section 2703(c),
which addresses the disclosure of “a record or other information pertaining
103. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). Craig Ettinger, Does the History
Behind the Adoption of the Fourth Amendment Demand Abolishing the Third-Party Doctrine?, 29 GEO.
MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 1, 19–23 (2018), for a general discussion about the third-party doctrine and its
creation.
104. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711 (2018).
105. Kerr, supra note 58, at 1209 (explaining the structure of the Stored Communications Act and
suggesting Congress amend the statute to better protect individuals’ stored internet communications).
106. Id. at 1209–10.
107. Id. at 1209, 1212.
108. Id. at 1212.
109. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)–(b) (2018).
110. § 2703(c).
111. Chamberlain, supra note 8, at 1756.
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to a subscriber to or customer of [a provider of electronic communication
or remote computing] service,” applies when the government seeks access
to CSLI. 112
Before Carpenter, the SCA ostensibly provided the government with
three avenues it could take to compel the disclosure of CSLI records. 113
First, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a governmental
entity can obtain a warrant. 114 Instead of using the process required for a
warrant, investigators could either obtain “the consent of the subscriber or
customer to such disclosure”115 or compel disclosure with a court order
under Section 2703(d). 116 In pertinent part, Section 2703(d) states:
A court order for disclosure . . . shall issue only if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant and material
to an ongoing criminal investigation. 117

Notably, the Government in Carpenter abided by the requirements
laid out in Section 2703(d) of the SCA in order to access Carpenter’s cellsite location information through a court order.118 A magistrate found the
Government had offered “specific and articulable facts showing that there
are reasonable grounds to believe that . . . records or other information
sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation” and
issued two court orders. 119 Investigators serve court orders under Section
2703(d) just like they would an ordinary subpoena—by bringing the order
to the service provider who then provides investigators with the information sought. 120
Holding that access to Carpenter’s CSLI nonetheless required a warrant seemingly does not undermine two of the relevant processes (obtaining
a warrant or prior consent) available to the government listed in Section
2703(c); however, when seeking sensitive information akin to CSLI and the
probable cause requirements are satisfied, the Government would presumably elect to issue a warrant, displacing the subpoena process. 121
112. See § 2703(c); Chamberlain, supra note 8, at 1756.
113. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212 (2018); Kerr, supra note 58, at 1218–19.
114. See § 2703(c).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. § 2703(d).
118. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212 (2018).
119. See § 2703(d); Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212.
120. See Kerr, supra note 58, at 1219.
121. Marty Lederman, Carpenter’s Curiosities (and its Potential to Unsettle Longstanding Fourth
Amendment
Doctrines),
BALKINIZATION
(June
26,
2018),
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Indeed, the Court’s holding is just as significant of a triumph for privacy rights as it is a departure from traditional subpoena practice and the
third-party doctrine.
III. A FOURTH STANDARD: ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENAS OR
SUMMONS
Created through statute, many federal administrative agencies are
charged with implementing regulatory or fiscal policies. 122 In order to fulfill those duties, agencies need sufficient investigatory power to access
information, which is largely derived from an agency’s power to subpoena
records and testimony. 123 Congress authorizes this power through a statute,
namely, the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) that grants agencies
subpoena power if another statute authorizes issuance.124 Thus, each agency has its own enabling statute granting it the power to issue administrative
subpoenas. 125
Today, administrative agencies have broad power to issue subpoenas
without prior approval from a grand jury or court.126 Individuals and entities subject to agency regulation often have an incentive to cooperate with
the agency’s subpoena or voluntarily produce documents or testimony. 127
But administrative subpoenas are not self-enforcing, and agencies need to
bring the subpoena to a federal judge in order to compel document or testimony production from those who choose not to comply.128 Further failure
to comply with a court order may result in the target being held in contempt. 129

https://balkin.blogspot.com/2018/06/carpenter-s-curiosities-and-its.html [https://perma.cc/EE8N-SLEZ]
(arguing that the Carpenter holding has “groundbreaking” implications for national subpoena practice).
122. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE USE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENA AUTHORITIES BY EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES AND ENTITIES (2002)
[hereinafter
DOJ
Report],
https://www.justice.gov/archive/olp/rpt_to_congress.htm#b19
[https://perma.cc/75YL-23DN].
123. See Graham Hughes, Administrative Subpoenas and the Grand Jury: Converging Streams of
Criminal and Civil Compulsory Process, 47 VAND. L. REV. 573, 579, 584 (1994).
124. See 5 U.S.C. § 555(d) (1966); COMPULSORY PROCESS, 1 Admin. L. & Prac. § 3:12 (Charles
H. Koch, Jr. & Richard Murphy eds., 3d ed. 2019).
125. See DOJ REPORT, supra note 122.
126. Id.
127. See Abraham Tabaie, Protecting Privacy Expectations and Personal Documents in Sec
Investigations, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 781, 797 (2008) (arguing that an entity being viewed as “cooperative” with the SEC may be important in resolving the Commission’s inquiry).
128. See, e.g., Sec. Exch. Cmm’n v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 741 (1984) (SEC subpoena is not self-enforcing); Wearly v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 616 F.2d 662, 665 (3d Cir.1980).
129. See 5 U.S.C. § 555(d) (1966); SUBPOENAS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2:4 (Lee Modjeska ed., 2019).
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Courts have not always respected administrative subpoena power.130
But with the introduction of New Deal initiative and in the aftermath of
economic crisis, the administrative state grew, and courts began affording
administrative subpoena enforcement more deference.131 While not without
its limits, the highly deferential standard has now governed administrative
subpoena enforcement for over seventy years.132
Indeed, the expansion of administrative investigatory power is derived
from the principle that excess judicial interference would hinder agencies’
ability to execute their statutory responsibilities. 133 As such, administrative
subpoenas are subject to a “reasonableness” standard, which requires a far
lesser showing than what is required under the “probable cause” standard
associated with issuing a valid search warrant.134 Courts today frequently
cite United States v. Powell, where the Supreme Court concluded the Internal Revenue Service did not need to meet the probable cause standard to
enforce its administrative summons requesting corporate tax records.135
Instead, the Court articulated a four-factor evaluation for deciding whether
a summons could be enforced, requiring that (1) the investigation is conducted for a legitimate reason; (2) the inquiry is relevant to the investigation’s purpose; (3) the agency does not already have the information
sought; and (4) the agency has followed the proper administrative steps in
issuing the subpoena. 136 While decided in the context of an IRS enforcement action, Powell is generally applicable to all administrative agencies. 137
Prior to Powell, administrative subpoenas seeking evidence “not plainly incompetent or irrelevant to any lawful purpose of the [requesting officer] in the discharge” of his or her statutory responsibilities were

130. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Am. Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 305–06 (1924) (prohibiting the
Federal Trade Commission from acquiring a corporation’s letters and wires through a subpoena).
131. See Tabaie, supra note 127, at 789.
132. See Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 509 (1943) (enforcing an administrative
subpoena requesting a corporation’s payroll records because the records sought were not “plainly
incompetent or irrelevant to any lawful purpose”).
133. See Hughes, supra note 123, at 584 (1994) (asserting the arrangement between the government and those engaged in licensed commercial activities would be “unworkable” without compulsory
process).
134. See, e.g., United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) (government requests
for corporate books and records are enforceable without a warrant as long as “the inquiry is within the
authority of the agency, the demand is not too indefinite and the information sought is reasonably
relevant”).
135. See 379 U.S. 48, 57 (1964).
136. Id. at 57–58.
137. See Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 741–42 (1984) (applying
Powell standards in litigation about enforcing an SEC subpoena).
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enforceable. 138 The Court reinforced this idea in United States v. Morton
Salt Co., indicating that an administrative subpoena is appropriate even if
the demand amounts to a mere “fishing expedition” designed only to confirm compliance with regulatory requirements.139 So long as the agency has
the authority to inquire, the demand for information is not too indefinite,
and the sought after information is “reasonably relevant,” enforcing an
administrative subpoena is appropriate. 140 Courts even defer to the agency’s determination in what information is “reasonably relevant” to an investigation barring a scenario where the court deems the agency is
“obviously wrong.” 141 Some of this deference results from agencies having
developed considerable expertise in technical areas such as taxation, securities, health and safety, or airplane design and safety. Consequently, administrative agencies enjoy significant leniency while seeking information and
do not necessarily need to connect the information sought to any actual
theory of violation. 142
Administrative subpoena enforcement and its doctrine has mirrored
that of grand jury subpoenas over the years, and some scholars argue the
two forms of compulsory process are completely assimilated. 143 Notably,
enforcing either type of subpoena would be subject to similar standards and
scrutiny. 144 But the justifications behind the grand jury as an investigative
body arguably contain a crucial component absent from administrative
investigations—that a grand jury functions to investigate and prosecute
crime while protecting citizens from “unfounded criminal charges.” In
theory, grand juries are independent, democratic institutions composed of
cooperating citizens and peers, which affords them special legitimacy in
American jurisprudence. 145 Neither of these justifications are applicable to
administrative agencies, even though agencies take advantage of the same
broad authority to gather information. 146 However, agencies are part of the
138. Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 509 (1943).
139. See 338 U.S. at 642–43 (attributing the power to “investigate merely on suspicion that the law
is being violated” to administrative agencies while analogizing agencies to grand juries); Powell, 379
U.S. at 57.
140. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. at 652.
141. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 877 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (concluding that
the FTC’s request for a natural gas producer’s bid files was “reasonably relevant” to its investigation,
and the FTC’s theory about the bid files was not “obviously wrong”).
142. See id. at 877.
143. See generally Hughes, supra note 123 (discussing the judicial approach to civil investigative
demands being based on grand jury principles).
144. See id. at 594–95.
145. See id. at 581–82; but see Kerr, supra note 55 (noting the prosecutors actually have control
over the grand jury).
146. See Hughes, supra note 123, at 589.
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executive branch and are subject to Congress’ oversight abilities; if they
become overly aggressive, the President could be held accountable.
In Carpenter, the Government analogized a 2703(d) order to a grand
jury subpoena, arguing that the order is an acceptable form of compulsory
process under the Fourth Amendment for the same reasons as grand jury
and administrative subpoenas. Rejecting the Government’s argument, the
Court concluded the Fourth Amendment requires a judicially issued warrant to compel disclosure of CSLI records, even if it had been a grand jury
or administrative agency wishing to issue a subpoena for the same records.
A. Government’s Grand Jury Argument in Carpenter
Referencing the standard articulated in the seminal case, Oklahoma
Press Publishing Co. v. Walling (“Oklahoma Press”), the Government
argued its 2703(d) order is similar to a grand jury subpoena duces tecum
and the Fourth Amendment allows it to subpoena documents as long as
Congress authorized the investigation “for a purpose Congress can order,”
the sought-after documents are relevant to the inquiry, and the “specification of the documents to be produced [is] adequate, but not excessive, for
the purposes of the relevant inquiry.” 147 The Government argued that, on
balance, the level of intrusiveness a subpoena imposes on an individual
does not outweigh the significant governmental interest acquiring information during the early stage of an investigation serves. 148
On the privacy side, compulsory process is justified considering the
subpoena target is requested to bring forth documents as opposed to the
government finding the information itself. Further, intrusion is limited as a
subpoena recipient may object before producing documents to the government. 149 Conversely, requiring a warrant supported by probable cause during the early stages of an investigation would significantly hinder
investigations in the public interest and render investigative duties nearly
impossible. 150 The Government asserted that its ability to investigate would
suffer if it were required to establish probable cause to issue a subpoena
when “the very purpose of requesting the information is to ascertain whether probable cause exists.” 151

147. Okla. Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946).
148. Brief for the United States at 45–46, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (No.
16–402), 2017 WL 4311113.
149. See Okla. Press, 327 U.S. at 195.
150. See id. at 213.
151. United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991).

740

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol 95:3

Alluding to grand jury and administrative subpoenas, the Government
emphasized that 2703(d) orders pursuant to the Stored Communications
Act share similar features to other forms of compulsory process validated
by courts without a warrant in that recipients bring forth the requested records and can object to the production in court, and the government often
relies on 2703(d) orders in preliminary investigations. 152
Certainly, the standard prescribed in the SCA for compelling CSLI
disclosure is more demanding than the standard imposed on a grand jury
(or an administrative agency) to issue a valid subpoena. 153 Congress decided on this standard after holding numerous hearings and debates. By ruling
out the SCA standard as insufficient, the Court is supplanting Congress’s
will as the voice of the People.
As stated, a 2703(d) order requires the Government to establish “reasonable and articulable facts” about the requested information being “relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.” 154 And compelling
disclosure pursuant a 2703(d) order requires judicial approval. By comparison, a subpoena duces tecum must be merely relevant to the Government’s
investigation, and the documents requested need to be “adequate, but not
excessive” for the same purposes. 155 Issuing a subpoena typically does not
require judicial involvement, but enforcing a subpoena after a recipient
chooses not to comply requires a court order.
Nonetheless, both grand juries and administrative agencies are afforded great deference in subpoena enforcement. Intuitively, given that Congress’s 2703(d) standard clearly satisfies the low subpoena requirements
and offers more protection to a recipient, it follows that the 2703(d) order
would be sufficient under the Fourth Amendment. But the subpoena analogy did not serve the Government, as the Court concluded the warrant requirement would still have been required even if a grand jury or
administrative agency had issued a subpoena for the CSLI records.
Admittedly, the scope of the Court’s holding beyond a 2703(d) order
seeking location information is unclear. The question is open as to whether
courts will apply Carpenter’s broad reasoning when evaluating government
access to sensitive or personal information unrelated with location, which
could be problematic for an individual or company considering how to
respond to a subpoena.
152. Brief for the United States at 46, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (No. 16–
402), 2017 WL 4311113.
153. See id.
154. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).
155. Okla. Press, 327 U.S. at 209.
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Justice Alito uses the SEC as an example of a federal agency with
power to request documents through an administrative subpoena. Like other agencies, the SEC has expansive investigative power in the name of
“investor protection” to obtain both business-related information and documents containing personal information such as medical, financial, and
email data.156 According to Alito, any order compelling the production of
documents containing sensitive information will now require a showing of
probable cause. 157 If that is the case, agencies that routinely obtain a wide
range of information from individuals or companies—like the SEC—may
lose some discretion in deciding which investigative leads to pursue and
which data to obtain a warrant for. 158
B. The Securities and Exchange Commission
1. History and Creation
In response to the worst economic crisis in American history, Franklin
D. Roosevelt enacted a myriad of legislative programs dubbed the “New
Deal,” which aimed to centralize federal government control over the
economy. Among the legislative programs enacted within FDR’s first hundred days in office was the Securities Act of 1933 (the “‘33 Act”)—the first
act of a collection that would eventually become known as the federal securities laws. The Great Depression and Wall Street crash of 1929 provided
the fuel necessary for Congress to create legislation governing the securities industry, an area in which states’ “blue sky” laws previously had autonomy. Today, there are eight primary acts governing the capital markets
industry: the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, the Investment Company Act of 1940, the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, and
the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012. 159

156. See Slobogin, supra note 88, at 806–07; Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S.
119, 124 (1953) (the intent of the Securities Act is “to protect investors by promoting full disclosure of
information thought necessary to informed investment decisions”).
157. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2260–61 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting).
158. See Paul Ohm, The Broad Reach of Carpenter v. United States, JUST SECURITY (June 27,
2018),
https://www.justsecurity.org/58520/broad-reach-carpenter-v-united-states/.
[https://perma.cc/3A6P-KSCH]
159. The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/answers/about-lawsshtml.html [https://perma.cc/U9H7-6JZU] (last modified Oct.
1, 2013) [hereinafter THE LAWS THAT GOVERN] (last visited Feb. 28, 2019).
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Generally, economic concern linked to investor confidence is one
primary justification for American securities regulation. 160 The prosperity
of capital markets and financial communities depends on people being
willing to invest, and people are more willing to invest if they have confidence that they are not being taken advantage of.161 In theory, securities
laws signify a commitment to curtailing marketplace abuse, and they add a
layer of confidence in investors by mitigating the “fear of exploitation.” 162
After Wall Street crashed in 1929 and many individual investors lost
their savings to worthless securities in the postwar decade, investors undoubtedly lost faith in public markets. With the ‘33 Act, Congress spelled
out its chosen remedy—disclosure. 163 Often referred to as the “truth in
securities” law, the ‘33 Act protects investors by requiring companies to
fully and fairly disclose important financial information about public offerings of securities during the registration process. 164 Justifying the federal
regulatory framework then depends on a core assumption that potential
investors will behave rationally and make informed decisions about whether to purchase a company’s securities in response to the information they
receive. 165
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “‘34 Act”) imposed greater
administrative responsibility and extended government reach further into
the securities industry. Consequently, Congress established the Securities
and Exchange Commission through Section 4 of the Act to address a laundry list of problem areas. 166 The ‘34 Act covers all aspects of publicly traded securities and also provides actions for market manipulation, insider
trading, manipulation concerning the purchase or sale of stock, misstatements among documents filed with the Commission, and various other
problems with securities sales, sellers, and buyers. 167 As such, Congress
granted the SEC, along with other administrative agencies initiated around
this time, broad power to directly regulate through rules, orders, and enforcement. 168 But Congress also enacted a check on the executive branch
and these relatively new agencies in 1946 with the Administrative Proce160. See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 5 (Rachel E.
Barkow et al. eds., 8th ed. 2017).
161. See id. at 4.
162. Id. at 5.
163. See THE LAWS THAT GOVERN, supra note 159.
164. Id.
165. See id.
166. See COX ET AL., supra note 160, at 9.
167. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW 4 (Kris Markarian ed., 3d ed. 2011).
168. See id. at 5.
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dure Act, which gave courts the power to review and invalidate problematic administrative actions. 169
2. The Division of Enforcement
The SEC is an independent, nonpartisan agency that operates through
four main divisions: the Division of Corporation Finance, the Division of
Trading and Markets, the Division of Investment Management, and the
Division of Enforcement. Because of its ability to investigate and prosecute, the Division of Enforcement gains frequent publicity and is the most
prominent of the divisions to the general public. 170 The Division of Enforcement is typically poised to initiate either an administrative proceeding
or enforcement action brought in a federal court, or to refer its findings to
the Department of Justice for criminal prosecution after investigating.171
In October 2008, the Commission made its Enforcement Division
manual (“Manual”) available for the first time, which lays out all the policies and procedures SEC enforcement officers are to follow while investigating a possible securities violation.172 But for purposes of this Note, the
most relevant process to emphasize is that which officers need to complete
to issue a valid subpoena for documents or witnesses pursuant to federal
securities laws. 173
Initially, the SEC begins investigating a possible securities violation
based on general market surveillance, investor complaints, media reports,
reports from other SEC divisions and offices, or referrals from various
other sources. 174 After obtaining enough evidence, the Director of the Division may issue a “Formal Order of Investigation,” which describes the nature of the investigation and designates staff members as officers for the
purposes of the investigation. Among other things, the designated officer
has the power to subpoena witnesses and require document production. 175
169. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–06 (2011); Tabaie, supra note 127, at 785–86.
170. See COX ET AL., supra note 160, at 15.
171. See HAZEN, supra note 167, at 18.
172. See KEEPING CURRENT: The SEC Enforcement Manual—An aid to combat SEC investigations,
AM.
BAR
ASS’N
(June
29,
2017),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2009/03/keeping_current_masella/
[https://perma.cc/CP39-45ES].
173. See SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N DIV. OF ENF’T, ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 41 (2017),
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf [https://perma.cc/SYS2-5L89] [hereinafter MANUAL].
SEC.
AND
EXCH.
COMM’N,
HOW
INVESTIGATIONS
WORK,
174. See
U.S.
https://www.sec.gov/enforce/how-investigations-work.html [hereinafter HOW INVESTIGATIONS WORK]
[https://perma.cc/TSM2-8TX7] (last visited Feb. 28, 2019).
175. MANUAL, supra note 173, at 17–18.
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C. The SEC has Broad, Discretionary Subpoena Power
The Commission has the power to subpoena any “books, papers, correspondence, memoranda, or other records” that are “relevant or material”
to the agency’s inquiry. 176 Like other administrative agencies, an SEC subpoena must abide by the requirements laid out in Powell. 177 For example,
remembering the executive subpoenaed for documents from the hypothetical described in the Introduction, she may object to the agency’s subpoena
based on constitutional claims or that the Commission overstepped its
boundaries in issuing the subpoena. Either objection would come about by
bringing a motion to quash the subpoena in federal court. While not the
only constitutional claim available, the hypothetical executive could challenge the subpoena under the Fourth Amendment, claiming that one or
more of the Powell requirements is not satisfied. Taken with Oklahoma
Press, the Fourth Amendment also requires the SEC’s subpoena to be definite enough in breadth and scope. 178
As stated, the Powell standards are extremely easy to enforce, and that
holds true for SEC subpoenas. The Commission has discretion in determining the justification for any given subpoena as the agency is the best situated to discern to what legitimate purpose the requested documents relate. 179
Similarly, the relevancy requirement is inconsequential for the SEC as the
agency does not have to affirmatively prove the documents requested are
relevant; on the contrary, documents must not be “plainly irrelevant.” 180
The last two requirements of the Powell test are technical ways to challenge a subpoena, which are seemingly unhelpful to an individual attempting to quash a subpoena based on privacy implications. 181 Consequently,
the current law does not provide much protection—much less privacy protection—through the Powell standards.

176. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(b) (2015).
177. See United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57–58 (1964).
178. See Okla. Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208 (1946) (noting the Fourth Amendment protects against document requests being too indefinite in their description of items to be produced).
179. See Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Brigadoon Scotch Distrib. Co., 480 F.2d 1047, 1053 (2d Cir.
1973) (acknowledging that the SEC must be free from interference when determining whether certain
activities fall under its jurisdiction).
180. Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Arthur Young & Co., 584 F.2d 1018, 1028–29 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
181. See Tabaie, supra note 127, at 795–97.
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IV. CARPENTER WILL SERVE AS A CHECK ON THE SEC’S VAST
AUTHORITY TO OBTAIN INFORMATION
As Justice Alito suggests, one possibility after Carpenter is a sweeping requirement that all court orders to produce documents containing sensitive information must be supported by probable cause in the future.
Certainly, that is an extreme example and would be “revolutionary.” For
the SEC, Alito’s opinion might not be that far-fetched. After all, subpoenas
issued by the SEC are functionally similar to a 2703(d) order described
above in Part II.C, and the Commission often requests personal information
from individuals during investigations that implicates the Fourth Amendment.
Referencing the 2703(d) order under the Stored Communications Act,
Justice Alito asserts that “nothing stops [the majority’s] logic from sweeping much further.” 182 Requiring the court order to produce documents to be
supported by probable cause ostensibly imposes the same requirement on
grand jury subpoenas and other agencies with the power to issue documentproduction orders such as the SEC, Federal Trade Commission, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and others. 183 For the same reason, Justice Kennedy warns that “the subpoena practices of federal and
state grand juries, legislatures, and other investigative bodies” are now
uncertain.184
Mirroring the Government’s argument described in Part III.A, SEC
subpoenas are often enforced without meeting warrant requirements for the
same reasons observed in grand jury subpoenas and many other administrative agencies. SEC subpoenas are minimally intrusive, objectionable by the
recipient, and necessary in determining whether a possible violation of the
securities laws exists. A valid 2703(d) order under the SCA has similar
qualifications and a clearly higher standard to meet than an SEC subpoena
conforming to Powell. Therefore, in theory, the Court’s invalidation of a
2703(d) order compelling disclosure of location information in Carpenter
would, in turn, invalidate an SEC subpoena requesting personal information akin to CSLI.
Even as part of a corporate entity, the hypothetical executive’s privacy
rights will be more salient after Carpenter when the SEC requests personal
information. As the SEC often names both the entity and the individual or
individuals in a formal investigation, distinguishing the rights between the
182.
183.
184.

Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2256 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2247 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2234 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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two is significant. Courts have done just that and rarely recognize any significant privacy interest in a corporation’s own books or other types of
business records.185 That assertion stems back to over 100 years ago when
the Court announced in Hale v. Henkel that the “corporation is a creature of
the State,” and thus Congress is appropriately able to investigate a corporation’s papers for wrongdoing. 186
Oklahoma Press made clear that the Fourth Amendment does not protect a corporation or its officers from producing corporate records and that
requests for such documents are not actual “searches” under the Fourth
Amendment.187 Therefore, Fourth Amendment requirements—such as
probable cause—are not imposed on administrative subpoenas, at least
when they seek corporate records.188
Shortly after the Oklahoma Press decision, the Court further differentiated a corporation’s rights from an individual’s in United States v. Morton
Salt Co. Because corporations are not equivalent to individuals in enjoying
a right to privacy, neither the Fourth nor Fifth Amendment privileges apply
to them. 189 Having both been decided in the corporate rights context, Oklahoma Press and Morton Salt seemingly carved out a different policy for
individuals—one that may have been alluded to in Carpenter.
An individual may still be unable to object to producing records such
as corporate tax or payroll reports, but there are other types of business
records that “implicate[] basic Fourth Amendment concerns about arbitrary
government power much more directly.”190 In Carpenter, the “business
record” Justice Roberts refers to is CSLI, which the SEC could theoretically issue a subpoena for under the ECPA. The Commission would have to
comply with the requirements laid out in the statute, the Enforcement Manual, and now Carpenter.
In fact, Congress has enacted several statutes that address individual
privacy in response to broad agency subpoena power, namely, the Privacy
Act of 1974, the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, and the aforementioned Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986. The SEC En185. See, e.g., United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 651–52 (1950) (concluding that
corporations as privileged entities do not enjoy the same rights to privacy as individuals); Okla. Press
Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208 (1946) (the Fourth Amendment only protects against requests
for corporate records that are too indefinite or irrelevant); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74–75 (1906).
186. Henkel, 201 U.S. at 74–75 (1906). But see Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S.
682, 707–08 (2014) (concluding that a closely-held corporations is a “person” under the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act).
187. See 327 U.S. at 195–96, 202.
188. See id. at 209–10.
189. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. at 652.
190. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2222 (2018).
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forcement Manual details how the Commission and its officers should
comply with all of these when requesting personal information from the
public, banking information, or records of electronic communications. 191
Notably, an individual customer has a privacy interest in financial records
held by a bank under the RFPA, but regulated entities such as brokerdealers or investment advisers are not afforded that same protection. Similarly, email communications are protected under the ECPA when stored
with third parties, but the ECPA does not extend to email communications
stored on a company’s internal servers or communications held directly
with the sender. 192
The Carpenter holding implies that CSLI is just one example of a
business record embodying the “modern-day equivalent of an individual’s
own ‘papers’ or ‘effects.’” In United States v. Warshak, the Sixth Circuit
gave an illustrative analysis of Fourth Amendment protections in a modern
world, holding that a CEO had a subjective expectation of privacy in the
contents of his emails and that expectation was one society would deem
reasonable. 193 There, the Government seized around 27,000 emails from
the CEO’s internet service provider pursuant to the SCA. The CEO’s email
accounts were critical for business communications, but they also contained his “entire personal life.” 194 Because of the sensitive and sometimes
incriminating information contained in the emails, the court concluded the
CEO clearly expected the contents of his emails to remain private. 195
Turning to the second prong of the Katz reasonableness test, the court
emphasized email’s prominence in today’s modern communication and
how individuals frequently and easily send sensitive information to others. 196 Access to an individual’s email may uncover business information
“relevant” to the government’s or an agency’s inquiry, but access would
also allow government officials or investigators a keen look into an individual’s personal life and activities. 197 The Fourth Amendment protects

191. See MANUAL, supra note 170, at 79–81 (discussing compliance with the Privacy Act, Right to
Financial Privacy Act, and Electronic Communications Privacy Act).
192. Id. at 81.
193. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
194. Warshak, 631 F.3d at 283–84.
195. See id. at 284.
196. Id. at 284 (“Lovers exchange sweet nothings, and businessmen swap ambitious plans, all with
the click of a mouse button”).
197. See id.
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other traditional forms of communication, and those protections should not
dissipate on account of advancing technology. 198
Although Warshak involved a third-party service provider, the holding
still signifies important privacy protections in personal information for
individuals involved with a business’s operations. The court recognized a
privacy right in sensitive information, even though such information was
blended with business communications that were undoubtedly “relevant” to
the fraud investigation. Taken with Carpenter, courts have begun showing
the willingness to expand and flex the Fourth Amendment to protect the
privacy of sensitive digital information.
V. THE HYPOTHETICAL HEDGE FUND EXECUTIVE HAS VIABLE
FOURTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS
In Carpenter, Justice Roberts assures the Government and administrative agencies that the subpoena will still be available to them “in the overwhelming majority of investigations.”199 Certainly, Carpenter does not
overrule the Powell standards or render them inapplicable in enforcing
most subpoenas. But when an individual is faced with an SEC subpoena
requesting documents that are either purely personal or personal comingled
with business documents, Carpenter allows a Fourth Amendment objection
to producing those documents—even if the documents are relevant to the
Commission’s inquiry. Of course, courts must decide whether Carpenter’s
reasoning covers sensitive and intimate information unrelated to location.
That seems likely as the Court condemned Justice Alito’s view that prescribed a “categorical limitation on the Fourth Amendment.” 200 In other
words, agencies and grand juries should not be able to circumvent the warrant requirement in obtaining personal documents such as “private letters”
and the “digital contents of a cell phone” based on nothing more than “official curiosity” behind a subpoena. 201
For the hypothetical executive referenced above, she ought to bring a
motion to quash the SEC’s subpoena, at least with regard to her personal
smartphone and emails. Information gleaned from those two sources may
be relevant to the SEC’s investigation, but they are both wrought with privacy concerns approaching the same level as CSLI. 202 Under Warshak,
198. See id. at 285 (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (advancing technology
should not be allowed to “erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment”).
199. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2222 (2018).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See id.
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accessing the executive’s emails may require a warrant, especially if she
does not have separate business and personal accounts. Accessing the executive’s smartphone, however, would almost surely require the SEC to
obtain a warrant supported by probable cause. Indeed, the Supreme Court
in Riley v. California recognized that modern cell phones are capable of
storing vast amounts of sensitive information and the “privacies of life.” 203
That phenomenon raises privacy concerns comparable to CSLI, but
potential problems do not lie exclusively with a cell phone’s storage capacity. Smartphones give people abilities they have never had before with
the touch of a finger, from paying virtually any bill to linking their diet or
weight-monitoring program to their Fitbit. All of these examples raise privacy concerns at least as salient as those associated with CSLI, and someone like the hypothetical executive should not forgo her privacy because
she wants to use modern capacities. Therefore, with the Carpenter Court’s
approval of both Warshak and Riley, a greater level of scrutiny ought to be
applied to administrative subpoenas requesting such personal information—the “reasonable relevancy” standard combined with the Powell
requirements will not suffice.
For the SEC, such an implication means the Commission may need to
reconsider for which types of records it issues subpoenas and for which
types of records the agency obtains a warrant. If anything, the officers
drafting a subpoena should do so more carefully, focusing on documents
that are clearly not private.204 A more precise subpoena would mitigate any
potential litigation over subpoena enforcement for private documents,
which seems to be a heavier consideration after Carpenter. The Commission could also develop an internal review board, separate from the investigators, that looks for material which is protected.
Undoubtedly, SEC regulated entities must assure they have an adequate compliance system in place, especially with policies and procedures
to address the production of business and personal documents.
CONCLUSION
The need for investor protection and proper market regulation has not
waned in the past years, and Carpenter should certainly not be interpreted
in a way that hinders the investigative abilities of the SEC, grand juries and
203. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
625 (1886)). In Riley, police officers’ safety did not justify ridding of the warrant requirement when
searching through an arrestee’s cellphone. See id. at 401.
204. See Tabaie, supra note 127, at 816.
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other administrative agencies alike. However, as American citizens become
more attached to and intertwined with their devices, the Supreme Court has
highlighted the tenuous balance between regulatory efficiency and constitutional protections. Rather than allowing agencies such as the SEC to demand documents based only on “official curiosity,” more scrutiny ought to
be applied to document requests implicating private documents, especially
as more people rely on modern technology for myriad purposes today.
While technological advances have convoluted the Fourth Amendment
privacy doctrine and created concerns the Framers could never have imagined, the sheer difficulty or complexity in enforcing constitutional rights is
no reason to abandon them altogether.

